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Abstract 
Using cross sectional data from all 47 Counties in Kenya, the presence of contract breaches between the 
producers and chain intermediary node is investigated. Most farmers do not engage in contracting and for 
those who do, many of these contracts are found to be informal. In addition, most of these contracts 
(whether formal or informal) were breached. However, some buyers appear to be associated with contract 
breaches. A distinct pattern emerges showing that larger milk producers are more likely to make formal 
contracts than small producers while the results also confirm that most of the contracts between farmers 
and individual consumers as well as traders and middlemen are informal and subject to contract breaches. 
Using a multiple correspondence analysis, these associations between contract breaches and farmer 
characteristics are explored. Results indicate that collective action institutions might encourage 
formalization of contracts while households that do not engage in some form of collective action 
engagements in most cases make informal contracts although both formal and informal contracts are 
equally subject to contract breaches. An examination of the underlying institutional, psychological and 
sociological drivers to contract breaches is recommended as such information can reveal how best to 
upgrade successful contract farming arrangements. 
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 1: INTRODUCTION 
Though dairy production in Kenya is the most 
commercialised in the Eastern African region, 
there are few production contracts at producer 
level linked to cooperatives, self-help groups, 
milk bulking/cooling centres and processors 
(Pelrine, 2009). With a share of almost 80% in 
raw milk supplies, small-scale farmers dominate 
dairy sector in Kenya. While only a small 
fraction of milk produced enters the formal 
market, the growth in demand for value-added 
dairy products, not only in the country but also 
within the East African Community (EAC), 
offers opportunities for making dairy farming 
more profitable for smallholders. To make this 
value chain more inclusive requires assurances 
of a stable supply of raw milk meeting food 
safety and quality standards, reduction in 
production and transaction costs thereby making 
raw milk supply a more stable and remunerative 
enterprise for smallholders. Many constraints 
confront smallholder farmers who often find it 
difficult to participate in markets for their 
products. Milk is perishable and bulky and 
moreover, in many occasions, producers cannot 
make short term investment decisions to cease 
production e.g. milk producers have already 
committed up-front investments and cannot 
easily abandon such investments at the drop of a 
hat. Low production by dispersed producers can 
also result in further power imbalances between 
buyers and sellers especially when producers act 
alone and have low access to market 
information. High transaction costs can also 
result from the lack of assured markets, high 
marketing costs (due to fragmented value 
chains), high costs of monitoring and quality 
assurance, high transport as well as dealing with 
contract breaches. Furthermore, seasonal 
volatility of raw milk supplies is pronounced due 
to predominantly rain-fed production system 
where many smallholders do not apply 
supplementary feeding mainly due to high feed 
prices.  
 
Following the deregulation of milk prices in 
1992, many milk marketing innovations emerged 
to complement the then state controlled Kenya 
Co-operatives Creameries. Compared to other 
commodities (e.g. maize) facing high price 
volatility, the dairy sector stabilized somewhat 
though some volatility persisted with one of the 
main causes being weather related factors 
(Karanja et.al., 2003). This can be further 
compounded by climate change which a study 
by Kabubo-Mariara (2008) suggesting that 
livestock enterprise choices can be influenced by 
climate change variables such as temperatures 
reducing the probability of farmers keeping dairy 
cattle and increasing the probability of holding 
beef cattle. 
 
Contract farming (CF) involving forward 
agreements specifying obligations of partners in 
a business transaction can be an avenue for some 
to bridge these barriers or share the imminent 
risks present in production and marketing in 
uncertain environments. Contracts can be 
efficient in linking producers to markets and are 
also effective in integrating smallholders into 
mainstream markets (Costales and Catelo 2009). 
However, contracts per se are not a panacea for 
all these challenges though successful CF 
models share in a number of characteristics. 
These include being able to fairly share value 
between business partners who have a voice to 
influence key decisions, including business risks 
and rewards (Vermuelen and Cotula, 2010). In 
the dairy sector, some farmers have made such 
contracts with firms while other farmer groups 
are vertically integrated and have ventured into 
both processing and distribution of milk and 
milk products. However, this number is still 
small and still, many farmers still appear to 
prefer spot market transactions. Abdulai and 
Birachi (2008) identified three coordination 
mechanisms employed by producers and traders 
in the dairy value chain and showed that written 
contracts were sparingly used compared to 
verbal contracts and spot market transactions. 
They also demonstrated that the extent of 
advance price information as well as time taken 
to sell milk and physical distance separating 
players in the business transaction tend to 
influence the type of coordination mechanism 
chosen by market players. Fischer and Qaim 
(2011) also demonstrate that in the case of 
bananas in Kenya, more diversified farmers are 
less likely to market collectively though previous 
benefits from collective marketing positively 
influence their intensity of group participation. 
Peer pressure from groups on the other hand can 
reduce behaviors such as side selling 
(Fafchamps, 2004) and trust based relationships 
nurtured over time can act as an enforcement 
mechanism (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001). In 
Kenya the success of the horticulture industry is 
partly attributable to CF and Hoeffler (2006) and 
Wainaina et.al (2012) argue that CF is beneficial 
to both potato and poultry farmers respectively. 
There is still debate about the definitive role of 
CF in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Oya, 2011) 
though CF is credited to have played a 
significant role especially during the immediate 
post colonial period in Kenya when tea and 
coffee farmers were able to form cooperatives to 
market their produce. 
 
Cases of side selling outside the contract are real 
however, and which, from a firm’s perspective, 
maintain supply risks for which contracts are 
entered into in the first place (Glover and 
Kusterer (1990). Reasons for contract breach 
include poor contract design, mistrust between 
contact partners or even contracts not made on 
sound analysis and planning by both parties. For 
instance, using an experimental approach on 
contract design in Vietnam, Saenger et.al., 
(2012) show that although sanctions on farmers 
to produce milk of high quality can induce 
quality increases, they are not as effective as 
bonus payments. In another paper from that 
study population, a gender dimension suggests 
that female farmers decision to trust in a contract 
arrangement may be different from that of 
men—they are less likely to trust when the cost 
of trusting is higher (e.g. in the presence of 
collusion) but are more trusting overall (Torero 
and Viceisza, 2011). A number of research 
articles have also shown that trust improves the 
outcomes in exchange implying that contractual 
arrangements—especially verbal ones relying on 
trust can still function with little enforcement if 
trust is maintained between the parties in the 
contract (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001). Will, 
(2013) puts special emphasis on the importance 
of trust in CF relationships (see pp. 22, 25, 28). 
An information asymmetry advantage can be 
gained by sellers who if in long term 
interactions, can lower prices to some clients—
who Granovetter, 2005a refers to as “known 
others”—a situation that can enhance 
fragmentation of the market and inhibit 
formation of a single equilibrium price. Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), Fehr et.al., (2007) suggest that 
fairness considerations can also determine the 
presence of contracts if some societal members 
are inequality averse, which in turn has support 
from some insights from psychology such as loss 
aversion (see Kahneman 2003).  
 
This paper briefly summarizes the contractual 
landscape for milk at the farm level and 
describes the relationship between milk 
producers and the business partners whom they 
supply raw milk. The paper goes further and 
attempts to make links between contractual 
failure and some business partner characteristics.  
 
2: METHODOLOGY 
Data used in this paper comes from a recent 
(2013) nationally representative sample of 
households in 47 counties commissioned by the 
Agricultural Sector Development Support 
Programme (ASDSP). A total of 12,654 farming 
households were interviewed after being selected 
using the proportionate to population size 
technique, based on the total number of farming 
households in each county. Actual data 
collection was performed by enumerators drawn 
from respective counties and who in turn were 
supervised by a county coordinator who oversaw 
their recruitment and training after going through 
similar introduction to the study objectives and 
tools. A structured questionnaire was used to 
capture data necessary for the exercise. This 
survey instrument was designed to capture a 
range of indicators for use by the ASDSP in its 
monitoring activities. Among the comprehensive 
list of parameters measured in this survey were 
household socio-economic characteristics, level 
of production and productivity for major 
agricultural and livestock commodities, 
consumption, marketing, and food / nutrition 
security, access to financial and insurance 
services. Following enumerator recruitment was 
a pre-test of the instrument after which actual 
data collection commenced in late September 
2013 and ended in October 2013 while data 
entry was undertaken thereafter by clerks 
recruited and trained for the purpose.  
 
In this paper, the authors explore for overt 
reasons and/or characteristics that maybe 
associated with contract breaches. This paper 
does however not try to establish the existence of 
different business models employable. Many 
studies on contract farming employ a transaction 
cost economics approach. This study does not 
take that route; rather, it relies on simple 
questions relating to the existence of contracts 
between milk producers and buyers of their 
product and tries to relate these variables to 
explore for patterns. The characteristics of milk 
producers (households) that may influence the 
choice of contract include membership to 
organizations/associations which other authors 
(see Shiferaw et.al., 2006) suggest are important 
in overcoming some of the market failures. Such 
groups are a source of solidarity where members 
have a sense of moral economy and sense of 
group identity conferring a normative and 
extraeconomic meaning to economic action 
(Granovetter 2005b). Productivity of milk 
(measured by the amount of milk produced over 
the course of 12 months) is also used as a 
parameter where high production expected to 
force producers to gravitate towards contracting 
due to issues of bulkiness and perishability of 
milk (see Goldsmith, 1985 cited in Baumann, 
2000, p.20). Milk production data for each 
household is estimated and ranked from highest 
to lowest from which four groups of equal 
frequency. The notion of bounded rationality 
comes into play since farmers are limited by the 
amount of knowledge they have when making 
the contract. Access to market information is 
important to farmers since it reduces risks in the 
way of making them likely to choose the best 
contract partner. Distance to output markets is 
used as a measure of the costs involved in 
bringing milk into the market. Respondents also 
gave responses about the partner with whom 
they made contracts with, the type of contract 
(whether formal or informal) as well as whether 
the contract was breached or not. Using this 
information, the authors use an exploratory 
technique to explore and establish the nature of 
associations between these sets of variables. We 
employ Multiple Correspondence Analysis 
(MCA); a technique that can reveal latent 
patterns in complex data sets, thereby helping to 
describe these patterns geometrically by locating 
each variable as a point in low-dimensional 
space. To implement this analysis, we use the 
FactoMineR (Hasson 2007 quoted in Lê et.al. 
2008) a package for multivariate data analysis 
with R (R Development Core Team 2014).  
 
3: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Close to 47.3% (5,985) of the 12,654 respondent 
households produced milk from camels, cattle, 
goats or sheep. Of the milk producers, 16.7% 
had contracts for the sale of milk during the 12 
month reference period. Many of these contracts 
were informal (64%) while the remainder were 
formal. These contracts were made between milk 
producers and cooperatives, institutions (public 
& private), traders, consumers, processors, 
hotels or even supermarkets. The most common 
parties with whom milk producers made 
contracts with included traders (hawkers, 
middlemen etc) and individuals; contracts that in 
most cases are informal. This complements the 
findings in many sector reports which show the 
informal milk marketing system to be handling 
most of the milk output. Cooperatives as well as 
milk processors make up another category of 
buyers who mainly made formal contracts with 
milk producers. Institutions (both private and 
public) as well as hotels also made contracts 
with producers though the frequency of these 
contracts was comparatively small (Table 1). 
Most of the contracts were breached (60%) 
while for the remainder, respondents said there 
wasn’t breach of contract—although a portion of 
them were not committal with their answer or 
avoided it altogether.  
 
 
Table 1: Number of milk sale contracts, types and the status of contract  
Type of contract With whom 
contract was made 
Was contract honoured? 
No Yes Silenta 
Formal Cooperatives 57 33 25 
  Hotels 10 2 1 
  Individuals 8 7 2 
  Private institutions 6 1 2 
  Processors 66 19 18 
  Public institutions 5 2 2 
  Traders 27 7 8 
Informal Cooperatives 20 6 11 
  Hotels 38 9 6 
  Individuals 105 52 42 
  Private institutions 5 3 1 
  Processors 14 1 1 
  Public institutions 6 1 0 
  Traders 139 42 38 
a Respondents failed to divulge the status of these contracts 
 
Households contracting with private institutions 
(though a small number) produced an average 
20,600 litres during the year whereas those 
selling to processors produced an average 14,700 
litres during the same period. Those contracting 
with hotels on the other hand were producing 
11,200 litres whereas farmers contracting with 
traders and hawkers were producing about 6,900 
litres a year. Those contracting with public 
institutions and individual consumers were 
producing an average 5,600 litres and 4,100 
litres on average. As shown on table 1 above, 
many contracts were made with individual milk 
consumers as well as traders and were mainly 
informal contracts. 
Of these households that had some form of milk 
sale contract, majority (70%) did not have a 
member of the household belonging to an 
agricultural group/association during the 
preceding 12 months. Of those that had 
household members belonging to these groups, 
membership was dominated by produce 
marketing types (53%), while input access and 
marketing comprised 11% of these groups while 
the remainder were groups of various shades 
such as seed production groups, savings and 
credit, soil & water conservation groups, water 
resource management among others types. 
Slightly over half (54%) of the respondents with 
contracts had a household member accessing 
market information in the last 12 months 
preceding the interviews. This is in contrast to a 
figure of 35% for all milk farmers in the sample 
signifying that households that have contracts go 
out of their way to obtain market related 
information. These results suggest that farmers 
who enter into contracts seek market information 
and are more likely to be engaged in common 
interest groups that have an interest in serving 
farmer’s need for marketing assistance.  
Results from the MCA are summarized on figure 
1 below. 
 Quadrant 1: Contracts appear to be made 
by farmers who have the lowest 
production indices selling their milk 
mainly to individual consumers. These 
farmers in addition do not seek for 
market information and output markets 
are far5 from the farm. This group of 
farmers is also likely to be without 
representation in agricultural groups 
and many contracts are breached.  
 Quadrant 2: Farmers enter into formal 
agreements with cooperatives and 
among this particular group of farmers; 
some of their household members 
                                                          
5 In this paper, we use a 35km cutoff radius to 
represent far-off markets while markets within this 
distance are assumed to be near.  
participate in produce marketing 
groups.  
 Quadrant 3: Farmers making contracts 
with private and public institutions as 
well as processors are informed (have 
access to market information) and this 
group appears to also have 
comparatively higher production 
indices. These farmers have household 
members belonging to input access and 
marketing groups as well as other 
collective action group types. 
 Quadrant 4: Farmers here make informal 
contracts with hotels and traders. 
 
Figure 1: MCA plot of variables using R package FactoMineR 
 
4: CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATION 
These results provide a glimpse into the 
contractual landscape that describes the Kenyan 
case and suggests that contracts are entered into 
by farmers whose production is fairly higher 
than average. Contract breaches have an 
institutional dimension and do not depend much 
on the formality of the contract. The findings 
illustrate that informal and formal CF co-exist 
with none of the types guaranteeing more 
reliable compliance or featuring higher risks of 
default. Given the diversity of situations, 
business attitudes, farmer and buyer capacities, 
socio-cultural structures and local environments, 
it seems rather difficult to come up with a 
blueprint for designing farming contracts. On the 
contrary, agreements have to be negotiated case 
by case. Further studies utilizing data on 
psychological and sociological profiles of 
players engaged in milk market contracting 
(which would enrich the analysis) may be 
required to tease out the drivers of the patterns 
described in the paper. Results from the MCA 
give interesting insights into structural 
particularities and possible success factors of 
different CF scenarios. While the prevailing 
situation in quadrant 1 suggests a need to 
promote the upgrading and up-scaling of existing 
informal CF as well as local cottage level value 
addition through capacity building measures, 
quadrants 2 to 4 lend themselves to a more in-
depth assessment to identify good practices for 
up-scaling more CF agreements. 
 
In conclusion, CF schemes will only be 
sustainable if both parties realise a profit 
(incentive for compliance) and if risks are shared 
with both partners working towards minimising 
risks of the joint CF venture. Experience shows 
that a farming contract is not worth being 
referred to as such if there is no trust between 
farmers and buyers and special attention has to 
be paid to assure fair give-and-take relations, 
open communication, transparent information 
and a fair voice for farmers in contract 
negotiations.  
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